International Affairs 93: 3, 2017 Theoretically, the main argument advanced is that Brazil's official engagement in IDC can be considered as an expression of a 'graduation dilemma', the main concept around which this special themed section of the journal is organized.
In this article, Brazil's IDC refers to a broad range of practices including educational, scientific, financial, humanitarian and technical cooperation. Technical cooperation and educational cooperation are thus conceptually subsidiary to international development cooperation. Brazil's 'graduation' refers to a historical process of change in international hierarchy, in terms of scale, social status and recognition. It implies not only an ambition to move upward in the hierarchy, but also a political drive to revise rules in the field of IDC. As Milani, Pinheiro and Lima recall in this special themed section of the journal, 4 the concept of graduation dilemma has four main elements, three of which are addressed in this article. The first element relates to the uncertainty confronting leaders of countries that are in a second-tier position in the international hierarchy (in the present case, Brazil), arising for the most part from contestation either by established powers that are members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), or by peers such as Mexico, South Africa or Turkey, which have also undertaken significant SSC projects in recent times. The dilemma here refers to the fact that Brazilian leaders may need to step up the international game and be more innovative in their own development cooperation approaches. The second element relates to the need for a second-tier power to use international institutions to promote changes in the field of IDC, which raises the question: through which multilateral organizations can a country such as Brazil promote change in IDC norms and rules? Are there institutional veto-players? Can Brazil build strong peer coalitions? The third element concerns the domestic social and political costs of Brazilian decision-makers' choices in the field of SSC: how can they publicly justify international cooperation with other developing countries in Africa or Latin America when many domestic social policies, particularly in the education sector, still require so much investment nationally? Bearing in mind this engagement with the concept of 'graduation dilemma', this article is divided into three main sections: first, an overview of Brazil's IDC; second, a discussion of Brazilian IDC in the field of education; and third, a review of Brazil's educational cooperation with Portuguese-speaking African (PALOP) countries.
Brazilian IDC under PT governments: policy sectors, domestic actors and priority regions
Irrespective of their contrasting perspectives, IR specialists agree on the fact that Brazil's foreign policy has gone through a series of changes under the PT governments of da Silva and Rousseff. 5 Notwithstanding the clear differences
International Affairs 93: 3, 2017 between them in terms of rhetorical skills, public diplomacy, and political and geographical priorities, both presidents emphasized autonomy, national development, regional integration, South-South relations, multilateralism and a multipolar world vision in their foreign policy strategies. Both also advocated a deeper reform of global governance structures to give more voice to emerging powers in decision-making. This political ambition, which did not have the support of all domestic political and economic agents, gave rise to the country's international prominence in building new coalitions (such as the G20 in the WTO negotiations, the India-Brazil-South Africa forum or the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), promoting interregional dialogues (between South America and Arab or African countries), leading the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and proposing mediation (together with Turkey) over the Iranian nuclear programme. 6 This new diplomatic profile also resulted in a considerable change in Brazil's IDC engagements, with governmental global expenses in this field increasing from US$158 million in 2005 to approximately US$923 million in 2010. Over the same period, technical cooperation expenditure grew fivefold, from US$11.4 million to US$57.7 million, and spending on humanitarian cooperation has risen from US$488,000 to US$162 million. 2011 -2013 (Brasília, 2016 .
International Affairs 93: 3, 2017 These figures show that Brazil has accelerated its engagement in South-South cooperation activities, even if the size of Brazilian IDC is not large by OECD DAC standards. It is true that these figures also illustrate an exceptionally high 2010 budget: the country's growth rate was around 7.5 per cent in that year, and several domestic ministries increased their participation in technical cooperation activities as a means of promoting their own policy initiatives. That was the case of the ministry of education, through the National Educational Development Fund (FNDE), and also the ministries of social development (MDS) and rural development (MDA). Fostering technical cooperation projects, very often in partnership with the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, ABC), which is part of the foreign ministry, and multilateral organizations (such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, and the World Food Programme), was a way to gain legitimacy for some social policies that were not consensual in the domestic realm, or at least not among key members of the political elite. The international dissemination of the food purchase programme, family agriculture support, school meals projects, aside from the well-known Bolsa Família programme-particularly with the support of UN agencies and the World Bank-was part of a strategy to make them more acceptable nationally.
The figures also demonstrate the disparity in scale between Brazil's IDC and that of other developing countries. For instance, in 2011 Brazil spent approximately US$588 million, whereas South Africa spent US$229 million, Mexico US$99 million, Chile US$24 million, Colombia US$22 million and Indonesia US$19 million.
9 Material differentiation from its peers is the first evidence of Brazil's ambition to move towards graduation in the field of IDC, even if Brazil's government does not consider itself a 'rising donor '. 10 Some comments are in order about the Brazilian accounting system for IDC, known as COBRADI. First, Brazilian IDC is statistically defined as funds that are 100 per cent concessional, i.e. without any obligation to repay. This can be interpreted as the Brazilian government demonstrating a political will to go International Affairs 93: 3, 2017 far beyond the OECD DAC's own definition of official development assistance (ODA), which requires a minimum of 25 per cent of concessional funds. One could also see this statistical definition as representing a political effort to revise the symbolic and conceptual dimensions of what has been set up by the DAC. Just as in global governance debates, where the Brazilian government has defended a thorough institutional reform of political and economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the UN Security Council, so Brazilian diplomacy could also be playing a revisionist role in respect of aid norms and cooperation institutions. Indeed, Brazil has joined China, India and South Africa in challenging the OECD's institutional role in the aid system. 11 As part of this diverse group of countries, Brazil under Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff tried to use its foreign policy to break the political and normative monopoly of OECD-DAC member countries. Second, because the COBRADI statistics do not take into account public funds that are not 100 per cent concessional in nature, they exclude loans given by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), foreign debt write-offs, or activities implemented by subnational entities within the Brazilian federation. As a result, COBRADI might underestimate the real Brazilian contribution in the field of IDC.
In terms of implementation, Brazil's IDC strategy gives priority to the exchange of experiences (policy practices), and emphasizes the use of government officials, civil servants and public institutions as a primary instrument of the country's contribution to international development. Delivering technical cooperation through civil servants from ministries and public agencies is one of the main characteristics of Brazil's IDC. This has to date contributed to hindering the growth of an 'aid industry' in Brazil. However, as a result, many civil society organizations end up being excluded from IDC projects and programmes. There are exceptions, such as Viva Rio, Associação Alfabetização Solidária (Solidarity Literacy, ALFASOL) and Missão Criança, which are examples of NGOs currently involved in the ABC's educational and humanitarian cooperation projects in Haiti and Guinea-Bissau. Nevertheless, several Brazilian rights-based NGOs criticize the Brazilian government for what they label as a 'participation deficit', a subject that still needs more attention from academic social science research and advocacy policy networks.
Brazilian IDC activities do not involve direct financial transfers to partner countries. As a result, it is very difficult to make comparisons between what the Brazilian government has been doing and what the OECD's DAC donors have done, since the basic statistical definitions are not the same. In spite of this, and taking into account all the statistical singularities of Brazil's IDC system, table 3 makes an attempt to contrast Brazil with other selected donors in terms of consolidated IDC expenditure in developing countries in general, and in PALOP countries in particular, for 2010.
12 What does the countries, which are taken as a case-study in this article; (3) the US is a major international donor, with decentralized USAID offices all over Africa, including in Luanda and Maputo; (4) Spain and South Korea have similar GDPs, and both have been very active in recent debates in the OECD about aid effectiveness; (5) South Korea is an emerging donor (like Brazil), and also a newcomer to DAC membership. Institutionally, the ABC was at this time the main national implementing agency for technical cooperation projects (taking 71.6 per cent of the total budget), followed by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA, 5.5 per cent) and the ministry of health's international cooperation branch (4.5 per cent). Technical cooperation is not a priority in terms of public expenditure: it accounted for 6.3 per cent of Brazil's total 2010 IDC budget, and an average of 7 per cent over 2011-13 (see tables 1 and 2). Even so, it is celebrated worldwide thanks to its adaptability to local contexts in other developing countries, and also to the fact that it mobilizes public policy expertise that is valued as international good practice. Agriculture, health and education were the three main sectors of Brazil's IDC between 2003 and 2014. 13 Apart from ABC, there are also special international cooperation units within 'domestic' ministries (health, education, culture and rural development, among others). Other IDC initiatives have also come from the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, participatory national councils (for instance, the very active Council on Food Security, CONSEA, as well as the Permanent Committee for International Affairs, CPAI, linked to the National Council of Rural Sustainable Development, CONDRAF), federated states and municipalities. Institutional coordination of all these activities is still a challenge to Brazilian authorities in general, and to the ABC in particular.
Geographically speaking, Brazilian technical cooperation is concentrated in two main regions: Latin America and Africa. This fact stems from the historical formation of Brazil's own society, its culture and, more recently, some identity changes in foreign policy: in the aftermath of redemocratization, and particularly since 2003, Brazilian foreign policy agendas have focused increasingly on SouthSouth relations. Scope for developing IDC projects with Latin American and African countries is facilitated by an existing network of diplomatic representation worldwide, which guarantees direct bilateral dialogue with many developing countries. Within the African continent, for instance, Brazil has 37 embassies, whereas France has 50, the United States 55, Mexico 8, Turkey 35, China 41 and India 29, according to data available on the websites of their respective ministries of foreign affairs.
Paradoxically, Brazilian IDC may also reveal public-private tensions that can be identified in the traditional practices of DAC members, since countries where technical cooperation projects are more numerous may also be those where Brazilian transnational companies and businesses are present. Brazilian foreign direct investment (FDI) and biodiesel) have emerged in more recent years, exacerbating these tensions and introducing some contradictions into Brazil's SSC discourse and practice. 14 FDI is of course different from IDC, but on the ground the divisions between practices and agents involved in one and the other are often blurred, just as they are in North-South cooperation. Brazilian businesses' strategies in Africa and Latin America may raise political and ethical questions about how different Brazil's procorporate economic growth is from other economic models promoted by western countries and rising powers. If Brazilian SSC strategies are to be a development alternative, empirical research needs to establish how distinctive they really are from traditional foreign aid practices.
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Brazilian IDC in the field of education: the main norms and features Brazilian government officials avoid terminology, criteria and norms stemming from the OECD DAC. Words such as aid, donor/recipient relationship and political conditionality are absent from both the official diplomatic discourse and the ABC's reports. A critical approach towards traditional aid, along with the country's own material and policy capabilities which enable it to promote its development without much dependence on North-South cooperation, have fostered the emergence of a global development cooperation strategy based on horizontality, nonconditionality and the demand-driven principle. These concepts are reflected in official documents produced by the ABC and IPEA. Horizontality implies a lack of hierarchical relationships between Brazil and its partner countries in terms of decision-making and project implementation; non-conditionality means that the Brazilian government should respect other sovereign developing nations, and should not impose any political conditionality related to democracy or human rights on its IDC programmes; the demand-driven approach is rooted in the idea that it is up to the partner developing countries to formulate and organize their demands with a view to cooperating with Brazil, without any interference from Brasília. Of course, these principles and narratives-including also the emphasis on co-responsibility, cultural and social commonalities, partnership and sharing of expertise, non-intervention in domestic affairs and state-to-state cooperation-are rooted in an official foreign policy rhetoric that must be interrogated through analytical and empirical work by independent researchers in the field.
Particularly between 2003 and 2014, Brazil's development cooperation policy was invested in the construction of a symbolic regime based on a commitment to South-South solidarity. Brazil is not a member of the OECD, and favours debates and proposals on IDC under the umbrella of the UN Economic and Social Council's Development Cooperation Forum, which is acknowledged by Brazilian There could be an effect of bureaucratic inertia, or it may be simply that the agenda is considered of less strategic significance by the new government. According to the ABC's online database, education is one of the three highestpriority sectors within Brazil's technical cooperation programmes, together with health and agriculture. Most of the technical cooperation activities developed in the education sector (TC/ED) are related to training, capacity-building, public management and technology transfer in the fields of vocational education, adult and youth literacy projects, non-formal education and special needs education. In terms of expenditure on both completed and continuing activities reported by the ABC between 2005 and 2013, education is ranked third after agriculture (19.26 per cent) and health (15.4 per cent), at 10.93 per cent, ahead of defence and military cooperation (9.14 per cent), environment (6.01 per cent), social development (4.47 per cent) and energy (4.02 per cent). Geographically, the ABC's cooperation in education is focused on Latin American, Caribbean and African developing nations, as well as East Timor.
In addition to supporting education through technical cooperation, as reflected in the data published by the ABC, Brazil's government also gives scholarships for foreigners to study at national universities. Indeed, scholarships constitute the main thrust of Brazil's development cooperation in education. According to the latest report, Brazil's federal government spent approximately US$55 million on educational cooperation projects between 2011 and 2013. 16 The provision of scholarships to enable foreign students to come to study in Brazil is a historical policy, launched in 1950. According to the 'educational themes' division of the ministry of external relations, the main objectives of Brazilian educational cooperation are: (1) to promote higher educational standards among citizens from other developing regions; (2) to foster dialogue in the field of education between Brazilian and foreign youth; and (3) to disseminate Brazilian culture and language. In fact, culture and education are both considered important sources of Brazil's 'soft power' in the international realm. They may also contribute to strengthening political and economic ties between Brazil and its partner countries. Cultural and historical ties are frequently mentioned in foreign policy speeches as a kind of justification for selecting PALOP countries as priority destinations for technical and educational cooperation. Brazil tends to concentrate its cooperation in the field of higher education on key Latin American and African countries: around two-thirds of graduate scholarships (PEC-G) are generally taken by PALOP students, and a similar proportion of postgraduate scholarships (PEC-PG) go to South American students. Once again, then, the geographical distribution of funding reflects foreign policy priorities; however, within the general foreign policy guidelines the ministry of education also tends to give preference to exchange programmes with countries experiencing deficiencies in their higher education systems. Latin American countries have a relatively better institutional development in the field of higher education when compared to other developing countries, and Spanish-speaking Latin American universities are among the oldest in the Americas: examples are Santo Domingo (founded in 1538 in the Dominican Republic), Lima (1551 in Peru), Córdoba (1613 in Argentina) and La Habana (1721 in Cuba). Accordingly, their main priorities in terms of exchange with Brazil tend to be research networking and capacitybuilding for PhD candidates. Between 2011 and 2013, the main sending countries for PEC-PG scholarships were Colombia (352), Peru (154) In the case of PEC-G students, the Milton Santos Project for Access to Higher Education (known as PROMISAES) has since 2003 provided per capita allowances of US$300 per month (an amount equal to the standard minimum wage in Brazil) to support the maintenance of some African students. However, not all students have access to this financial support. Students are selected in their own countries, according to procedures designed by the national ministry of education and the local Brazilian embassy. In the period 2011-13, the main sending countries for graduate courses (PEC-G) were Guinea-Bissau (173 students), Cape Verde (169), Angola (158), Paraguay (63), Congo (61), Benin (51) Institutionally, the ministries of education, science and technology and of external relations (educational themes division) have been the main conceivers and executors of exchange and scholarship programmes. The ABC plays no role in this particular area of policy expertise, its activities being confined to evaluation, monitoring and implementation of technical cooperation in the field of education. This division of tasks within the external relations ministry indicates a first layer of agenda fragmentation, inhibiting both bureaucratic coordination and global reporting capacities. Brazil's educational cooperation with PALOP countries
As tables 4 and 5 show, African countries (in particular the five PALOP countries) are key partners for the ABC and the Brazilian ministry of education. Educational cooperation with these partners takes various forms: distance and vocational education appears as the main activity implemented by the ABC, but in budgetary terms educational exchange programmes rank above all other types of educational cooperation between the Brazilian government and the PALOPs. 21 The Rio Branco Institute of the foreign ministry (the Brazilian diplomatic academy) also receives young diplomats from Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe for professional training, and some Brazilian civil society organizations may be called upon by the Brazilian government to implement non-formal education projects for young people or adults. Even so, in the case of the PALOP countries too, Brazilian educational cooperation is focused on PEC-G and PEC-PG programmes.
According to the available official data presented in tables 4 and 5 (overleaf ), between 2000 and 2015, 5,500 students came to Brazil on graduate scholarships (PEC-G) from PALOP countries, representing 57.7 per cent of a total of 9,523
International Affairs 93: 3, 2017 foreign students, and between 2000 and 2014, 489 postgraduate students (PEC-PG) out of a total number of 2,638 (18.5 per cent). This confirms that students from PALOP countries account for the greatest proportion of participants in the PEC-G scholarship programmes, and represent the third major group (after Latin America and all African countries put together) under the PEC-PG programmes.
Moreover, still under the rubric of cooperation in the field of higher education, two new federal universities were recently established in order to promote cooperation with Latin American and PALOP countries: UNILA (Federal University for the Latin American Integration) in 2008, and UNILAB (Federal University for the International Integration of the Afro-Brazilian Lusophony) in 2010. Alongside their more traditional academic activities, these two universities also bear responsibility for receiving students from Latin American and PALOP countries. This governmental decision reaffirmed the relevance of these regions in Brazil's international strategy. Today UNILAB has 4,726 students, of whom 3,398 are graduate students. Among these 3,398 graduate students 2,510 come from Brazil, 81 from Angola, 91 from Cape Verde, 540 from Guinea-Bissau, 26 from Mozambique, 81 from Sao Tome and Principe, and 69 from East Timor. Another 1,328 students are enrolled in distance education programmes (1,167) and in postgraduate courses (161).
22 However, the current budget constraints imposed by the new government 22 UNILAB's website (www.unilab.edu.br) presents information about many cooperation missions and visits 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 threaten the continuity of programmes implemented by these two new federal universities, which were created under a PT government.
Countries
In global terms, a comparison between the amounts of Brazil's IDC/ED and selected DAC donors' ODA in the field of higher education may open up new avenues for the analysis of Brazil's potential impact in the PALOP countries. Table 6 presents data for the same selection of countries as in table 3, this time for ODA in the field of education (ODA-ED), alongside Brazil's IDC/ED to all developing countries and to PALOP countries in particular. The first point to note is that the degree of concentration on higher education programmes is very significant in the case of Brazil: higher education represents more than 99 per cent of all its IDC/ED with developing countries, whereas in the case of Portugal the proportion is 60 per cent; for South Korea around 27 per cent, the United States 19.5 per cent, the United Kingdom 10.7 per cent, Spain 10.2 per cent and France 6 per cent. Second, looking only at the PALOP countries, the United States and United Kingdom are strikingly almost entirely absent (Britain grants meaningful funding for Mozambican education, but not higher education). Third, the data suggest a possible element of competition between Portugal and Brazil: Portuguese ODA-ED is higher than Brazilian IDC/ED in all PALOP countries, apart from Guinea-Bissau. However, confirmation of this hypothesis, based on a involving the nine members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 soft power rivalry between a former metropolis and a rising state in their respective relationships with the five African countries, requires further statistical analysis, alongside in-depth qualitative analysis and field research. There is a range of possible reasons why the Brazilian government, in particular between 2003 and 2014, decided to concentrate educational cooperation programmes in higher studies to this extent, notably in PALOP countries. First, it is a simple and effective modality of cooperation: the government just needs to create places and offer vacancies, most of which are in public universities not yet full to capacity with domestic students, so that bringing in international students contributes to reducing unused capacity in university infrastructure and staff. Second, related operational and transaction costs are very low. Exchange programmes mainly mobilize institutions at the federal level, where the country excels in terms of bureaucratic capacity and professional management of projects. Also, cooperating through universities does not necessarily imply giving grants to international students. Some obtain grants from their own governments, whereas others are civil servants in their home countries; there are also students who may benefit from grants that are given by DAC member countries within the framework of triangular cooperation schemes. Third, cooperating through universities projects a favourable image of Brazilian higher education institutions. Internationalization is a key variable in world university rankings such as the Times Higher Education, Shanghai's Academic Ranking of World Universities or the QS Top Universities. Therefore, receiving African students also contrib- utes to a better performance by Brazilian universities in the global and regional higher education competition. Fourth, through higher education cooperation programmes Brazil can also disseminate its contribution in many scientific areas; theories, concepts and methods developed in Brazil may be spread in part through the foreign students who participate in the international circulation of ideas and research. Exchange programmes create a direct link between education, training and science. By means of capacity-building programmes addressed to the elites of its partner countries, Brazil's government is able to foster professional networks linking national citizens and international students who may become future managers, chiefs of departments, diplomats, heads of ministries, etc. in their home countries. Thus exchange programmes bolster solidarity between academic and political elites on both sides of the South Atlantic. Fifth, one of the dimensions of the graduation dilemma related to the social and political costs of the choices the government makes can be more easily tackled: whenever the government has to justify its expenditure on development cooperation in public audiences before parliamentarians and civil society activists, or to the press, these four sets of motives can be articulated along with a legitimation narrative based on the fact that the government does not divert resources from the field of fundamental education, where domestic needs are still acute.

Concluding remarks
In this article, we have provided information on Brazil's role in a relatively less well-known area of international cooperation: education. The emphasis on South-South cooperation, on specific areas selected for the provision of aid, and on new ways of framing Brazil's role in development cooperation under the most recent PT administrations should help the reader to understand how Brazil used this policy in pursuit of its ambition to rise to a more influential status in international affairs, thus illustrating the notion of 'graduation dilemma' explored in this special themed section of the journal. The various sets of data provided clearly add weight to the argument presented and corroborate the claim that, despite a series of institutional obstacles and other growing national shortcomings, Brazil's contribution in the field of education should not be disregarded in wider comparisons of current international assistance flows. The analysis presented here further highlights how strongly African Lusophone countries stand out as clear priorities for this kind of sectoral cooperation, particularly in terms of higher education. It also provides some interesting clues to what may be expected in the years ahead, in terms of Brazil's own institutions and their range of action and capabilities in this area.
In spite of the current economic crisis affecting both emerging and established markets, the political influence of rising powers such as the BRICS countries is rapidly increasing in international development, as shown by the creation of the BRICS' New Development Bank and China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but also by reforms to the IMF's quota system and governance that have International Affairs 93: 3, 2017 recently become effective, thus giving more power and greater say to these countries in global economic decision-making. 23 Through their foreign policy agendas as providers of technical, economic, humanitarian and educational cooperation, these countries are also seeking a greater role in international rule-making, which, alongside political ambition, is one of the two key markers of graduation, as it is considered in this issue of International Affairs. In the particular context of Brazil between 2003 and 2014, both factors were present. Brazil's role in IDC was also motivated by a search for a wider recognition of its own social policies and development trajectory as potentially useful to other developing countries. Policy transfer is therefore one of the means most frequently employed by Brazil in its IDC schemes.
By means of educational cooperation, the Brazilian government has sought to establish substantive international relations with Latin American and African (especially Portuguese-speaking) countries. There are at least three dimensions to this endeavour. First, education relates directly to the qualification of labour, and Brazilian cooperation seeks to build capabilities in partner countries where it also has strategic investments (the economic dimension). Second, educational cooperation is part of a positive foreign policy agenda, through which Brazil aims to promote closer relations between states and societies based on principles of solidarity and non-intervention in other developing countries (the symbolicpolitical dimension). Third, higher education training and language learning programmes contribute to the strengthening of cultural bonds between different societies and the promotion of increased mutual understanding of the realities of different countries, and also to the dissemination of Brazilian culture (the cultural dimension). In the case of PALOP countries, the cultural and historical dimensions are key aspects in understanding the evolution of educational cooperation programmes since the 1970s.
However, Brazilian IDC/ED with PALOP countries also shows important shortcomings. Brazil emphasizes horizontal cooperation and interstate cooperation, but-in contrast to traditional donors-it only exceptionally channels its cooperation through civil society organizations. Moreover, there are no formalized mechanisms of meaningful civil society consultation on IDC policy conception and implementation. Despite this participation deficit, the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs, when applied to international cooperation, provokes public debate in Brazil around human rights and democracy promotion. The case of the 2012 military coup in Guinea-Bissau provides a good example of the Brazilian government's contriving to bypass the debate: although it observed the rules of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), which had suspended Guinea-Bissau from all forms of intergovernmental cooperation, including federal government educational programmes, Brasília introduced an element of flexibility by allowing students from Guinea-Bissau to enrol for
